One way to 1)egin a negotiation subdialogue is to express doubt at a proposition. However, expressions of doubt occur in a variety of forms, each of which conveys information about the nature of the doubt that is important for the subsequent resolution of the conflict. This paper presents our work on realizing expressions of doubt appropriately in natural language dialogues.
Introduction
Participants in a collaborative natural language dialogue must develop mutual beliefs about what is said, what is meant, and the implications for the task at hand. We may think of each utterance as a proposed change to the agents' common ground (Clark, 1996) . Since autonomous agents enter the dialogue with differing domain, world, and personal knowledge, it is inevitable that some beliefs conveyed by an utterance will not be accepted because they conflict with existing beliefs of the agent. However, it is also the case that these conflicting belief~ will not necessarily result in rejection of the proposed beliefS, but in subdialogues to negotiate a modification that is acceptable to both agents (Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1995) . One w~y to begin such a subdialoguc is to express doubt ~t the beliefs proposed by an utterance. In the following example, the boldface utterance is expressing doubt at the previous utterance 1 (Transcripts, 1982) 1Throughout this paper I use the phrase "doubt at an utterance" in place of "doubt at a proposition conveyed or implied by an utterance." I do not mean the utterance itself is somehow doubted, but that the utterance introduced the object of doubt into the dialogue. It may be the case that the agent is doubting a proposition expressed in the uttermme, or doubting the optimality of, or ability to execute, an action suggested in the utterance.
2All of the examples in this paper, except where otherwise noted, are from this source.
H: oh no. ira's were available as long as you are not a participant in an czisting pension
An e×pression of doubt is an utterance that conveys uncertain disbelief in a proposition that was introduced in an earlier utterance. An expression of doubt signals that the speaker does not accept the utterance at which she is expressing doubt, but she is neither expressing a "neutral" attitude toward it nor rejecting it with certainty 3. In the above e×am-ple, J cammt be said to be rejecting the proposal outright, because her response indicates that she is uncertain in her disbelief.
A natural language system must be able to express doubt, particularly in cases where it; has incomplete or uncertain knowledge. Exmnination of natural language corpora shows that expressions of doubt may be realized in a variety of forms. Furthermore, the fbrm of the utterance conveys information about the nature of the doubt that is important tbr the subsequent resolution of the conflict. Thus a collaborative natural language system must be able to generate utterances that convey doubt naturally and effectively. This paper presents our work on realizing expressions of doubt appropriately in natural language dialogues.
Previous Work
In Chu-Carroll and Carberry (1998) the collaborative planning process is modeled as a ProposeEvaluate-Modify cycle, in which an agent is able to detect conflicts in belief and initiate collaborative negotiation subdialogues to attempt to resolve the conflicts. They use a modified version of Galliers belief revision inechanisln (Galliers, 1992; Logan et al., 1994) to determine whether to accept a proposition and in determining which conflicting beliefs to use to refute an utterance that is not accepted. However, their work does not address how an exi)ression of doubt should be realized in a natural language utterance. Vander Linden and Di Eugenio (Vander Linden and Di Eugenio, 1996) studied negative imperatives 3Absolute rejection may be expressed as doubt for the sake of politeness. We do not address that issue here. in instructional texts. They used machine learnlug to correlate features of an action X's relationship to the reader in terms of attention, awareness, and safety, with whether it was realize(t as Don't X, Never X, or Take care not to X. In our research, we draw on their notion of identifying how features of the generation context correlate with how an utterance should be expressed. However, our work differs Dora theirs in that we must deal with an agent's belie£s motiw~ting his doubt and we consider a wider range of variations in realization.
3
Communicating an Expression of Doubt
We assume appropriate mechmfisms for detecting conflict and determining when to engage in a subdialogue by expressing doul)t (Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1998) , as well as an approi)riate belief revision mechmfism, and in this paper concentrate on how an expression of doubt should be realized as an utteranee. A cooperative agent should be as informative as ne.eded, without expressing too much irreleva.nt intbnnation (Grice, 1975) . Thus, in formulating an expression of doubt, we must consider how much the doubted ageut needs to know in order to collaborate in resolving the doubt and how much we can expect him to infer without being exl)lieitly told. In addition, Clark (1.996) argues that particiI)ants in discourse select; utterances that express their eommuni(:ative intent efficiently, oft, ca in sentence flagmeats. Since such efficiency of ezpression is the expected natural form of discourse, a hearer is likely to (terive unintended imt)lications from significantly less economical realizations.
Expressions of doubt, by our detinition, signal nonacceptance because of 'unccrl, ain disbelief. In order for the doubted agent to attemt)t to collaborate in resolving the doubt, he needs to know several things. Most basically, he nee(is to recognize that there is doubt in a particular utterance. In the absence of an objection to an utterance, the speaker will assmne an implicit acceptance (Lmnbert and Carberry, 1999) . To efficiently negotiate an acceptable resolution to the belief conflict, ideally the doubted agent must know something about the 1)ellen of the doubtiug agent; in particular, which belief(s) are causing her nonacceptance, and the strength of these beliefS. If the doubted agent decides to retain his original beliet:s, this information helps him to construct an argument that will be maximally effective and efficient in his attempt to convince the doubting agent (Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1998) .
To i(lentifs~ how expressions of (loubt are realized in naturally occurring dialogue and how tiles(; realizations convey the requisite beliet's, we analyzed features of individual ext)ressions of doubt extracted from natural corpora, and correlated the various forms of the utterances with the features of the underlying beliefs, t{owever, as explained ill Section 3.3, the use of machine learning techniques was not apt)ropriate due to the nature of our corpus. Section 3.1 discusses features of underlying beliefs and Section 3.2 discusses the various forms that an expression of doubt can take. Section 3.3 then presents it set of rules that relate the two.
Belief features
As noted above, beliefs play a prominent role in expressions of doubt, since a speaker will ideally convey enough intbrmation tbr the hearer to diseern 1) that she is expressing doubt, 2) what she is doubting, 3) any support she has tbr the doubt, and 4) the strength of this supi)ort. In addition, speakers tend to differentiate new SUl)porting int'ornlalion from that which is already part of the COlIlliIOU ground aud which should already have been considered. These beliefs are often IIot explicitly stated, but are assumed to be inferable by the doubted agent based on his knowledge of the previous dialogue, knowledge of the other agent's belieN, a model of stereotypical beliefs, linguistic knowledge, and the particular realization of the doubting agent's utteralice.
For example, consider the following assertion and two possible responses, each expressing doubt at; the prot)osition P, to~,a that John Smith gets $800 a month fl'om Social Seeurityd: S: ,loh, n Smith, (lets $800 a month in Social Security.
1) U: Isn't h,e less th, an 62 yem's old?
2) U: $800'?
In 1) U relies on illutua,1 donmin knowh:dge to express (hml)t at Pdo,,bt by contending some ()tiler proposition Pi that implies -,P, to~,bt (Lamllert and Carberry, 1999) , namely that Slnith is younger than 62. In the rest of this paper, P, to,,a refers to the doubted proposition and Pi to a proposition other than Pao,,bt, if any, that is the reason for this doubt.
In addition, expectations also play a role in expressions of doubt. In the simplest case, the violated expectation is just that I~to~,bt is fiflse. In other situations, an agent may have an expectation that a proposition will be false if instmltiated with some particular subset of its possible instantiations. Responses that conflict with these expectations may provoke an expression of doubt, even though the doubting agent may have little or no support for the ext)ectation. Such violated expectations are oftel1 signaled by elliptical fragments, such as response 2) above where U conveys not oIfly that she doesn't 4This is not a naturally occurring example, but was made up for exl)lanatory lmrposes.
accept Pdo~tbt, but also that her doubt steins from tile instantiation of tile amount term as 8800. We hypothesize that U might accept a t)roposition with a different instantiation of tile amount term, lint U doesn't explicitly state this, and other instantiations may be irrelevant. A violated expectation will be referred to as PC and is described further in Section 3.1.2. When and how these expectations arise is a topic for fllture research.
We assume the t)ropositions Pao~,l,t, Pc, and Pi, as well as the fact that we want to express doubt, as inputs to our generation process. Note that every expression of doubt will be associated with some Pdoubt and solne Pc, since for every expression of doubt, there must be some doubted proposition and some inconsistency between the doubting agent's expectations and belief in Pdoubt. There may or may not be an associated Pi, depending on the doubting agent's beliet~ supporting ~Pdo,,bt. Lack of a Pi indicates that tile agent's belief in ~P(to,tbt is unsupported ~.
Based on the information that a speaker will ideally convey when expressing doubt (as discussed at the beginning of this section), we hypothesize that the following aspects of a speaker's beliefs are significant factors in how an expression of doubt is realized.
Features Associated with P,,o,a,t
Endorsement of Pdo,a,t: Refers to the authority behind the asserted proi)osition, which imi)acts the strength of tlm hearer's doubt (Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1998) • Expert -The information is coming from a domain expert, or coming from someone with firsthand knowledge (including personal preferences).
• Reliable -The agent suggesting the proposition is not an expert, trot is considered a generally knowledgeable source.
• Questionable -hffbrmation thai; doesn't come fl'om an expert or reliable agent, or that is stated uncertainly by such an agent.
3.1.2
Features Associated with P,, Pc. feature: /2~ refers to a violated expectation. In the following, we identify three kinds of expectations that may be violated by an assertion. For illustrative purposes, assume that S has made the following assertion:
S: The most you will 9et back on your taxes is $~00.
• Term-value: Pe = False (-I~to,,bt, _term, _value) 5AIthough human agents may generally be able to offer soine weak supt)orl, for their l)ellefs, it is possible, depending on the belief revision system used, to have no supporting evidence for a belief (Logan et al., 1994) .
Tile doubting agent may fail to accept -P, lo,bt with _term instantiated to _value, due to an expectation that _value is not one of tile instantiations of _term that would make -Pdo,,~t true. For example, the hearer of the above assertion by S may have expected a much larger vahm than $400, with little or no support for this expectation.
• Constraint:
P~ = F alse(-P~toubt , _term, _value, _constraint)
The doubting agent may fail to accept -]~lo~,bt due to an expectation that -Pdo,,~t will be false when _term is instantiated with _value, in situations in which _constraint holds. This constraint is not a term in -Pdo,,~t, lint tile doubting agent believes that the speaker of -l~zo,,~t intends that the constraint hold. For example, the hearer of the above assertion by S may believe that S means $400 for the whole 3,ear, but may have expected a larger amount unless S was referring to, say, quarterly taxes.
• General:
P~ = False(-P~lo,bt)
The doubting agent may fail to accept l%~o,,~t in its entirety without having a specific objection to any particular term in tile prol)osition.
3.1.3
Features Associated with Pi ~ Commonality of Pi refers to tile source of the doubting agent's conflicting belief, if any.
• Old -A prior conflicting belief is already i)art of tile explicit common ground of tile dialogue.
• New -The doubting agent doesn't believe, that her conflicting belief is already part of the common ground estat)lished t)y the preceding dialogue.
Endorsement of Pi refers to the strength of evidence supporting the belief 1~ that is in eonfiiet with the doubted belief. The endorsements are listed here from strongest to weakest.
• First-hand -Belief is a personal t)reference or sometlfing directly experienced.
• Expert -Belief supported 1)y expert testimony, or thought to be common knowledge among experts in tlfis domain.
• Reliable -Belief conmmnicated from someone who, while not an expert, is generally considered a knowledgeable source of information.
• Default -Belief believed to be common knowledge, in tim sense that the speaker strongly believes it and strongly believes that others who belong to a certain community (namely one which she has in common with the other dialogue agent) believe it as well.
awe make the simplifying assumption that only one such proposition has been identified for use in an expression of doubt, as this is 1;he case in all of the expressions of doubt we encountered in our corpus. We leave consideration of expressing multiple l~'s in one utterance for fllture work.
• Derived -Belief is (leriv('.d froln other 1)e.liefs in such a way that it is considered strong.
• Ilyl)othesis -The 1)elief is derived fl'om other beliefs in such a way that it; is considered weak. This category includes beliefs derived from analogy with another belief in a similar 1)roposition.
• None -The belief is unsupported.
Endorsement
of hnplication ret>rs to the strength of evidence SUl)l)Orl;ing the belief that Pi being true ilnl)lies thai; Pdo~,bt is not l;rue. The endorsements are listed from strongest to weakest. Wc assume the salne definitions as the category above and that the two lists lie on the same strength scale. That is, a.n iml)lication endorsed as reliable is the same streng(;h as a P+ endorsed as reliable and stronger tlmn a I} endorsed as hypothesis. The only addition to this list; is the Logical (,Jldorsement to ac-(:omd; for instance.s in which P,~,,,,a can I)e logically deduced from Pi.
• l,ogieal -~P,l<,,,bl dircc(,ly inferred from I}.
• First-han(l r • ExI)ert
Form features
Expressions of (lollbl; ()c(:ur in a variol;y of forlllS. We dis(Anguish l;holn actor(ling to l;h0, surfa(:(~ form o17 l;h(~ lll;1Ler~tllce~ tim t)l'eSc, n(:(~ of two clue wor(ls, and ~he sl)ecifi('ii;y of tim informal;ion conve, ye(1.
Surface Form
• Surface Negative Question -"Isn't that, only worth what someone will I)ay ti)r it?" This (;ai;(~gory also includes negative tag (tuestions.
• Simple interrogative-"Can I join the [RA when i am 657"
• Statement as Question -"I must tile a return?" t n s category also in(:ludes ellit)ti(:al fragments su('h as "$4007"
• Siml)le declaration -"I calculated 10."
• Prot)osition within a belief ('lause -"I thought they only started this year." 
Specificity
-General forms of the expression (;all 1)e more or less specific in tile amount of intbrnmtion COil\Toyed.
• Generic: Sentence that is a general question of the previous utterance. Many of the exi)ressions of doubt in our COlI)tlS are non-ideal, t)ecause they were not recognized as doul)t or because information that was not included in t, he utterance, lint could have been, was ultimately needed to resolve the doul)t. Thus it was not al)l)ropriate to use the corlms as training data tbr machine learning. Consequently, tile following rules are l)ased and implication beliefs that would have caused tile form of expression of doubt to be generated. We also encouraged subjects to write in beliet's which were not inchlded, but none (lid. Out of the 60 instances (ten expressions of doubt times six subjects), tim subjects five times chose beliefs that we did not represent as contributing to the doubt and three times failed to recognize a belief that (lid contribute.
The subjects also rated the beliefs according to strength. We evaluated these ratings to see if the communicated strengths were correlated with the endorsements of beliefs that would have generated this form. Since subjects varied in the ranges that I;hey used in rating the strengths of the beliefs, we looked at tile scores relative to each subjects ratings of the other beliefs. Most of the strength ratings were consistent with the rules. The most fi'equent inconsistency was the case in which we would have generated a form based on slightly different endorsements for Pi and the in> plication, but our subjects rated them equivalent strengths. While it may be the case that tmotfle don't actually perceive a difli;renee, it may also be the case that numerical ratings don't fully capture the same information that t, he notion of endorsements do.
The only significant inconsistency with our rules was one utterance ill which doubt was expressed by "1 thought that, but my husl)and, lie wasn't sure if that just uleant ss pension." We had represented the, husband as a relial/le source an(l t;hus generated illformatioll about the, source of the conflicting propo sit;ion. In this instance, the doul)t was not judged very strong l)y our subje(:ts, and tlm agent's t)eli(~f in her husband's exl)ertise as relatively weak. In future work, we will further explore exi)ression:s of doubt for which it is imi)ortant to (:omnmnicate the som'(:e of inforlnation.
\Ve consider this a l)reliminary (;valuation to show that the rules we have l'ormulated thus fitr are re;> sortable, l?urther evahlation will tie neexle, d to provide cvitlem:e that subjects really do draw &J. [('rcnt inferences based on the different forms of exl)ression and that our rules accurately captnr(. ~ these ditti?reUCeS.
Conclusion and Future work
This pape.r has 1)resented rules that could be used by a natural language system to realize exl)ressions of doubt. We have identified sew;ral forms that are used to express doubt ill naturally occurring dialogues. Our rules correlate these forms to 1)eliet~ of the doul)ting agent, takiug into consideration the l)eliefs that must be conveyed tbr the utterance to be a successflll exl)ression of doubt. Preliininary evaluation shows that the belief feature values in our rules correspond to hmnan sul> jects' intuitions about tile strength of tile doubt. In addition, the beliefs that would generate each t:onn are consistent with the belief~ that the subjects attrilmte to tile doubting agent when that form was used.
Future work will e(meentrate on refining the features and exploring more explicit reasoning about tile beliefs of the other agent. We also plan to explore the role of intonation in realizing expressions of doubt.
